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Any adjustment is somewhat dependent upon the
appropriateness of the underlying model – if the
model is appropriate the confounding effect of the
prior variables is reduced or eliminated, while if the
model is inappropriate a confounding effect remains.
– Donald B. Rubin
Abstract
Confounding seriously impairs our ability to learn about causal rela-
tions from observational data. Confounding can be defined as a statistical
association between two variables due to inputs from a common source
(the confounder). For example, if Z → Y and Z → X, then X and Y will
be statistically dependent, even if there are no causal connections between
the two. There are several approaches available to adjust for confound-
ing, i.e. to remove, or reduce, the association between two variables due
to the confounder. Common adjustment techniques include stratifying
the analysis on the confounder, and including confounders as covariates
in regression models. Most adjustments rely on the assumption that the
causal effects of confounders, on different variables, do not co-vary. For
example, if the causal effect of Z on X and the causal effect of Z on Y
co-vary between observational units, a confounding effect remains after
adjustment for Z. This causal-effect covariability and its consequences is
the topic of this paper.
Causal-effect covariability is first explicated using the framework of
structural causal models. Using this framework it is easy to show that
causal-effect covariability generally leads to confounding that cannot be
adjusted for by standard methods. Evidence from data indicates that
the confounding introduced by causal-effect covariability might be a real
concern in applied work.
∗anders.ledberg@su.se or anders.ledberg@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
A core focus in epidemiological studies is on estimating effects of causes. The
causes are often called treatments or exposures and the effects of interest are
typically restricted to some pre-specified outcomes (e.g. Rothman et al. 2008).
Epidemiological investigations of causal mechanisms are typically formulated in
terms of potential outcomes or counterfactuals (e.g Rubin 1974, Robins 1986),
see Herna´n & Robins (2018) for review. According to this framework, the
causal effect of a treatment is defined as the difference between the outcome
when taking the treatment and the outcome when not taking the treatment.
Since only one of these events can be observed (the other is counterfactual),
causal effects are typically estimated using observations obtained in different
observational units (e.g. participants in a study), where different groups of
units receive different treatments. If suitable conditions apply, average causal
effects can be estimated consistently and without bias both in experimental and
non-experimental settings (e.g. Herna´n & Robins 2018).
In most cases the effects of a given cause will vary between observational
units – the treatment might have slightly different effects in different partici-
pants. Indeed, this is why the focus typically is on average causal effects and
not on the causal effects within a particular unit. Variability in the effects
of a cause is sometimes referred to as treatment heterogeneity, or causal-effect
heterogeneity (e.g. Morgan & Winship 2007), but will here be referred to as
causal-effect variability, or effect variability for short. In experimental studies,
where treatments can be randomly assigned to units, average causal effects can
be identified in the presence of causal-effect variability. The randomization is
expected to cancel out all effect differences between groups receiving different
treatments, except those effect differences caused by the treatment (e.g. Rubin
1978, Greenland & Robins 1986). In observational studies, on the other hand,
the groups exposed to different treatments might also differ in other aspects,
and the estimated effects of treatment might therefore be confounded with other
causal effects (Miettinen & Cook 1981, Greenland & Robins 1986, Greenland
et al. 1999, Greenland & Morgenstern 2001). A central theme in observational
studies is therefore to find conditions under which groups receiving different lev-
els of treatment are exchangeable with respect to the counterfactual outcomes
(e.g. Greenland & Robins 1986), see Herna´n & Robins (2018) for a general
discussion of exchangeability and confounding. In applications, workers try to
achieve exchangeability by adjusting for covariates believed to be confounders
(e.g Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983, Herna´n & Robins 2018); where a confounder
can be defined as a variable that has a (perhaps indirect) causal effect on both
exposure and outcome (see Herna´n & Robins 2018, Ch. 7). Indeed, properly
accounting for confounding is a fundamental requirement for the identification
of causal effects of exposures.
Variability is also expected in the causal effects of confounders. Since con-
founders, by definition, affects both exposures and outcomes, perhaps through
different mechanisms, it is important in this case to consider causal-effect co-
variability. Effect covariability is defined as the extent to which the effects of a
given cause co-varies between observational units. In the work presented here,
causal-effect covariability of confounders is formalized and the consequences of
such covariability are described. In particular, it is shown that when there is
causal covariability in the effects of a covariate on exposures and outcomes,
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residual confounding will remain after adjusting for the covariate. The impli-
cation is that statistical associations between exposures and outcomes might
be erroneously interpreted as evidence for causal connections between the two.
Causal-effect covariability of confounders might be a relatively common phe-
nomenon and deserves more attention in applied work.
In the next section a formal model of causality will be used to study effect
covariability of confounders. A simple example will follow, where these conse-
quences are easily seen. Subsequently, evidence for causal-effect covariability in
real data is provided
2 Theory
The derivations in this section rely on the structural account of causality as
given, for example, in Spirtes et al. (2000) and Pearl (2000). The counter-
factual framework of causality, perhaps more familiar to epidemiologists (e.g.
Rubin 1974, Robins 1986), can be formulated within the structural account
(see the textbooks by Pearl (2000) and Herna´n & Robins (2018) for more on
the connection between these different frameworks). Some relevant concepts
are introduced below, but for a full account please refer to the references given
above.
For clarity, this section will focus on a system with only three observed
components, X, Y , and Z say, where X will stand for exposure, Y for outcome,
and Z for confounder.
2.1 Structural causal models
In a structural causal model, causal relations are represented by equations which
can be mapped onto causal graphs. For example, assume we want to model the
dependencies between X, Y , and Z, with the aim of quantifying the causal effect
of X on Y . Assume further that the states of X and Y are both partially caused
by Z and that Z represents all the common causes of X and Y . Other causes
(if any) influencing the variables in the model are lumped into “error terms” or
“disturbances” ε. This model is then represented symbolically as
Z := εZ
X := g(Z, εX)
Y := f(X,Z, εY ),
(1)
where the symbol := is used to indicate that this system of equations represents
a causal identity and not an algebraic one. The functions g(·) and f(·) are non-
random, but otherwise general, and the error terms are assumed to be mutually
independent. In a structural causal model each equation “represent a stable
and autonomous physical mechanism” (Pearl 2000, p.22) implying that it can
(at least in principle) be manipulated separately from other equations in the
model. This important property of causal models is sometimes referred to as
modularity (e.g. Woodward 2003).
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Figure 1: Causal graphs. A: causal diagram corresponding to the model of
Equation 1. B: causal diagram corresponding to the intervened model Equa-
tion 2
2.1.1 Causal diagrams
It is often instructive to represent structural causal models as directed acyclic
graphs, so called causal diagrams (Pearl 1995). In such graphs the variables in
the model correspond to nodes and a direct causal effect between two variables
is represented by a directed arrow between corresponding nodes in the graph.
In Figure 1A the model of Equation 1 is represented as a causal graph.
A path between two nodesX and Y is a set of non-identical pairs of connected
nodes where all nodes, except X and Y , occur in exactly two pairs. Thus,
starting at X, a path is a set of consecutive connected nodes in the graph that
leads to Y . Often there are several paths joining any two nodes. In Figure 1
there are two paths between X and Y , namely X → Y and X ← Z → Y .
A node W on a path between X and Y that has two incoming arrows (e.g.
X → W ← Y ) is said to be a collider. A path between X and Y is said to be
d-connected if it does not contain any colliders. A backdoor path between X and
Y is a d-connected path that starts with an incoming arrow. Thus, the path
X ← Z → Y is a backdoor path between X and Y . For the work presented
here, d-connectedness is important due to the following result: Two variables
connected by a d-connected path are statistically dependent, see (Pearl 2000,
Theorem 1.2.4).
2.2 Causal effects
Within the structural framework, causal effects are defined through the notion
of an intervention. An intervention can be thought of as a manipulation to
force one or more of the variables in the model to take on certain values. Using
Pearl’s do() notation, the causal effect on Y of X = x (i.e of forcing X to take
the value x) is written P (Y |do(X = x)), and is defined as the probability of Y
in the intervened model:
Z := εZ
Y := f(x, Z, εY ).
(2)
In words, in the intervened model, the variable X in Equation 1 is forced to
take the value x, the rest of the model is left intact (which is possible due to
modularity). In terms of causal diagrams, an intervention in X corresponds to
removal of all incoming arrows to X (see Figure 1B).
In epidemiology, the causal effects of interest often involve comparisons of
two (or more) levels of a treatment. Assuming for the moment that both X and
Y are binary indicators of treatment and disease, respectively, then the causal
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risk difference, as an example, equals
E(Y |do(X = x1))− E(Y |do(X = x0)),
where expectations are taken with respect to the intervened distributions.
A fundamental question is if causal effects can be identified from observa-
tional data (i.e. without the experimenter being able to manipulate the causal
mechanisms). In general this depends on the structure of the causal model
(Pearl 2000, Ch.3). For the model described by Equation 1, the causal effects
of X on Y can be identified by adjusting for Z. Indeed, if Z is held constant
(at Z = z say), then the effect of X on Y equals the causal effect of X on Y (at
Z = z). Averaging over Z gives the average risk difference in this case:
E(Y |do(X = x1))− E(Y |do(X = x0)) =∫
[E(Y |X = x1, Z = z)− E(Y |X = x0, Z = z)] dP (z).
This “adjustment formula” is valid because Z “blocks” all the backdoor path
between X and Y (Pearl 2000, Ch.3).
In the next section it will be shown that the identifiability of the causal effect
in this simple model depends critically upon that the causal effects of Z do not
co-vary.
2.3 Between unit variability
To proceed we must explicate the concept of an observational unit. An obser-
vational unit is an entity where quantification (measurement) of variables are
made. In medicine and epidemiology this is typically a participant in a study
(for example a patient), however, a unit can be some other entity, depending on
the scope of the investigation (a hospital, a school, a city, a country, etc). In a
typical investigation, observations are made on a number of different units, but
there are domains where repeated observations on one unit are more appropri-
ate.
Note that the causal model described by Equation 1 contains no reference
to observational units. To proceed we therefore make the following
Assumption. The structural causal model (Equation 1) is an adequate model
for all observational units in the population. However, the causal effect of Z on
X and Y might differ between units.
In other words, we assume that a model of the type represented by Equa-
tion 1, is a valid approximation of the causal mechanisms within each person
participating in the study and that the effect of Z (on Y and X) might be
different in different participants. This a very common (and often implicit)
assumption in applied work.
Next we turn to a causal model appropriate for a population of different
units.
2.3.1 Representing the causal-effect (co-)variability
Since the focus of this work is on the consequences of causal-effect variability
of a confounder (here Z), variability in the effect of X on Y will be ignored.
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Including variability in the causal effect of X will complicate the story, but will
not alter the conclusions.
To represent the causal-effect variability of Z in the model we introduce two
sets of variables, UX and UY say, and assume that they modulate the effect of
Z. These sets of variables can be thought of as parameters of the functions g(·)
and f(·) respectively. In other words, we write Equation 1 as
Z := εZ
X := g(Z,UX , εX)
Y := f(X,Z,UY , εY ).
(3)
In keeping with the assumption above, UX and UY are constant for a particular
observational unit, but may vary between units. To extend the model (Equa-
tion 3) to a causal model for a population of units, we must consider possible
causal dependencies between UX and UY . One way to make such dependencies
explicit is to consider the smallest set of variables, U say, such that UX and UY
are conditionally independent given U . Or, in terms of the structural model of
causality, U is the smallest set that d-separates UX and UY (Pearl 2000). De-
pending on the set U we get two separate cases. In the first case, U = ∅, which
implies that UX and UY are independent and that their effects therefore can be
subsumed into the error terms. In this case there is no causal-effect covariability
and Equation 1 is the appropriate causal model also for the whole population
of units. In particular, the average causal effect of X on Y is identifiable also
in the population.
In the second case, when U 6= ∅, three new equations must be added to the
model. A causal model in this case is given by the following equations
Z := εZ
U := εU
UX := k(U, εUX )
UY := h(U, εUY )
X := g(Z,UY , εX)
Y := f(X,Z,UX , εY ),
(4)
where as before the error terms ε· are assumed to be mutually independent. In
words, in different observational units the variables in U take different values.
The functions h(·) and k(·), transform U to the parameters needed to model
the responses to Z. The system in Equation 4 is modular and is a causal model
appropriate for a population of units. This model is represented by the causal
graph shown in Figure 2. This graph shows that there is a d-connected path
between X and Y , through U , that is not blocked by Z. This implies that X and
Y are statistically associated within levels of Z, independent of the existence of
a causal connection from X to Y . In particular, we have that
P (Y |do(X = x), Z = z) 6= P (Y |X = x, Z = z).
Consequently, unless we observe U , the causal effect ofX on Y is not identifiable.
In the causal model for an individual unit, i.e. Equation 1, the only backdoor
path between X and Y goes through Z. The backdoor path through U in
Figure 2 is a consequence of the (assumed) causal-effect covariability of Z. This
is stated as a general result.
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Figure 2: Causal graph corresponding to Equation 4
Main result. Assume that the causal effects of a confounder Z on exposure
X and outcome Y varies between observational units. If the effects of Z on X
and Y are statistically dependent, then the causal effect of X on Y cannot be
identified without adjusting for additional variables.
This result is not just a restatement of a well-known pitfall of observational
studies: “there could always be unmeasured confounders explaining the associ-
ation between exposure and outcome”. According to the above result, residual
confounding is to be expected after adjustment for any confounder with covari-
ability in the effects. Thus, unless there are good reasons to believe that the
effects of a confounder are either constant or do not co-vary, residual confound-
ing should be considered when interpreting an observed association between
exposure and outcome (c.f. Herna´n & Robins 2018, Sec. 7.4).
3 An illustrating example
Here we consider a simple example of a binary exposure X, a binary disease
indicator Y , and a binary confounder Z. Assume that the exposure does not
cause the disease, and that the confounder takes the values zero and one with
equal probabilities (i.e. P (Z = 1) = P (Z = 0)). Assume further that in a given
individual, indexed by i, Z has the following effect on X and Y ,
Pi(X = 1) = 0.5 + αi(1 + Z)
Pi(Y = 1) = 0.1 + αi(1 + Z),
where αi is a parameter. We assume that αi takes on only two different values,
0.1 and 0.2 say, and that these values occur with the same frequency in the study
population. For a given observational unit, the effect of Z is consequently an
increase in the probability of both exposure and disease with the same amount
(since α is constant within units). For example, an individual for which α = 0.1
would have P (X = 1) = 0.6 and P (Y = 1) = 0.2 if Z = 0 and P (X = 1) = 0.7
and P (Y = 1) = 0.3 if Z = 1. Table 1 shows the probabilities for the different
possible cases, illustrating that Z is increasing the probability of both exposure
and outcome. Note that X and Y are independent within levels of Z and α.
For example, if α = 0.1 and Z = 0 then the risk of developing the disease for
the exposed is P (Y = 1|X = 1)/P (Y = 0|X = 1) = 0.4; for the unexposed it is
P (Y = 1|X = 0)/P (Y = 0|X = 0) = 0.4. Consequently, the relative risk (i.e.
risk in exposed
risk in unexposed ) equals 1.
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α = 0.1
Z = 0 Z = 1
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 0 Y = 1
X = 0 0.32 0.08 0.21 0.09
X = 1 0.48 0.12 0.49 0.21
α = 0.2
Z = 0 Z = 1
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 0 Y = 1
X = 0 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.05
X = 1 0.49 0.21 0.45 0.45
Table 1: Probabilities for the example, normalized within levels of Z and α, i.e.
P (X,Y |Z,α).
Z = 0 Z = 1
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 0 Y = 1
X = 0 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.07
X = 1 0.48 0.16 0.47 0.33
Table 2: Probabilities for the example, normalized within levels of Z
(P (X,Y |Z)), and rounded.
However, assume now that the between-unit variability in the effects of Z
are not observed (i.e. assume α is not observed). Using the assumption of equal
proportion of individuals with α = 0.1 and α = 0.2, the observable probabilities
in this case are those shown in Table 2. The relative risk of getting the disease
is now associated with exposure, within both levels of Z. Indeed, for Z = 0
the relative risk is 1.08 and for Z = 1 it is 1.3, corresponding to an average
relative risk of 1.19. The marginal (over levels of Z) relative risk is 1.34, so
stratifying the analysis on Z reduces the “effect size” but leaves a substantial
residual due to variability in the causal effect of Z. Thus, after adjusting for Z,
the relative risk is still confounded by the effects of Z (the true (causal) relative
risk is 1.0, by assumption), and this residual confounding is due to causal-effect
covariability.
The assumption that the effect modulator α only could take two different
values is inessential for the effect to appear. Similar effects are obtained if α
varies randomly between units. In other words, if the exposure and outcome
probabilities in each individual would have the following form
Pi(X = 1) = 0.5 + αiX(1 + Z)
Pi(Y = 1) = 0.1 + αiY (1 + Z)
it would suffice that (αiX , αiY ) are statistically dependent for an effect similar
to that shown in Table 2 would occur.
In the next section, evidence of causal-effect covariability in real data will
be demonstrated.
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Figure 3: Tentative causal graph for the real data case. The dashed line repre-
sent unmeasured confounding.
4 Causal-effect covariability in real data
Here I will describe an observational data-set and show that a probability model
that includes causal-effect covariability fits these data better than a model that
does not. The primary aim is to provide an example of causal-effect covariability
in real data, not to describe a scientifically relevant case that warrants further
study. The example might appear remote from typical studies in epidemiology,
but should not be taken to imply that causal-effect covariability is a minor issue
in such studies. The implication is rather that there is a lack of public data-sets
where a convincing demonstration of causal-effect covariability can be made.
4.1 The variables
To build on the formalism of previous sections we need a three-variable system
where it is reasonably likely that two of the variables (X and Y , say) are not
causally affecting each other, but are mutually affected by the third variable,
Z. Furthermore, as shown in the Appendix, if the causal effects of Z on X
and Y are approximately linear, then the presence of causal-effect covariability
implies that the covariance of X and Y , conditional on Z, will have a particular
dependence on Z. Thus, a linear causal effect of Z leads to constraints that can
be used to fit a probability model to the data.
The following three variables, arguably, approximately fulfills the above con-
ditions: The variable X will stand for strength of the knee extensor muscles
(knee strength henceforth), and Y for hand-grip strength (grip strength). Body
weight will serve as the confounder (Z). Note that body weight is a variable
that can (in principle) be manipulated within individuals and that it therefore
makes sense to conceive of causal models in each observational unit.
A change in body weight is likely to cause a change in muscle strength, pro-
portional to the change in weight, for the following two reasons: (i) if weight
increases, more force is required to move around, and the extra force is propor-
tional (i.e. linear) to the increase in weight. (ii) Bigger muscles weigh more and
the strength of a muscle is roughly proportional to the cross sectional area of
the muscle (Maughan et al. 1983), which is proportional to the weight of the
muscle. It is also reasonable to assume that strength of leg and arm muscles do
not exert a direct causal influence on each other. There are, of course, many
other causes of knee strength and grip strength and some of these causes will
affect both variables (e.g. physical exercise). Figure 3 shows a tentative causal
diagram for the causal effects between the variables in a single individual, the
dashed line represents unmeasured confounders.
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4.2 A probability model for the data
The following probability model will be used to fit the data for each level of the
confounder Z:
X = µX + βXZ + εX
Y = µY + βY Z + εY
βX = bX + εβX
βY = bY + εβY
(5)
with
(εβX , εX , εβY , εY )
d
= N(0,Σ),
where N(0,Σ) represents the multivariate normal distribution with zero mean
and covariance matrix Σ, and
d
= denotes equality in distribution. The key term
in this model is the covariance between the coefficients of Z, i.e. between εβX
and εβY . This term models the causal-effect covariability of Z. To test the
contribution of this term, the model represented by Equation 5 was fit both
with and without the inclusion of this term. The models were fit by numerical
maximization of the likelihood. See the Appendix for more details.
4.3 The data
Data on these three variables were obtained from a large public-domain data set
originating from measurements made on young Swedish men tested as part of
enlistment for compulsory military service. The data-set contains observations
of a large number of variables in men who were tested during the years 1969-
1996. Most men were around 18-21 years of age when tested. Select parts of this
data set has featured in a large number of research publications. Both hand grip
and knee extensor strength were measured using highly standardized protocols,
the details of which are unfortunately not public (Ortega et al. 2012). Data and
R-code is available in the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/
aledberg/causal-covar.
4.3.1 Case selection
To make a linear relation between body weight and muscle strength more plausi-
ble (this is needed to model causal-effect covariability) the range of body weights
were restricted to be between 64 and 75 kg. Persons with weights outside this
interval were excluded. To further increase the plausibility of a linear causal
model, persons not having a body height in the interval 178-181 cm were ex-
cluded (height might also have a causal effect on muscle strength, and this
restriction will lessen the impact of height). After these steps there remained
observations from approximately 175000 persons in the data set. The data can
be thought of as representing hypothetical changes of the weight-strength rela-
tionship in persons of very similar heights with an initial weight of 69 kg (the
average weight in this population).1
1Of course, weight can be perturbed in many different ways, and the causal effect on
strength will likely depend on the perturbation used (see Herna´n & Taubman (2008) for a
related discussion on using weight as an intervention).
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full model reduced model
parameter estimate 95% C.I. estimate 95% C.I
mX 67.7 (52.6, 116.3) 65.0 (54.0, 72.5)
mY 310.9 (279.4, 332.2) 308.6 (305.9, 309,8)
bX 7.4 (6.7,7.6) 7.5 (7.34, 7.61)
bY 4.6 (4.2,5.0) 4.6 (4.56, 4.63)
σ2εX 114.4 (37.9, 437.0) 3213 (3172, 3249)
σ2εY 2401 (1169, 5475) 2575 (2554, 2624)
σεXεY -523.0 (-653.9, 679.9) -2317 (-2332, -2265)
σ2βX 2.24 (2.03 2.49) 2.75 (2.73, 2.76)
σ2βY 1.01 (0.23, 1.25) 1.03 (1.01, 1.04)
σβXβY 0.63 (0.25, 0.67) n.a. (not in model)
σβXεx 0.25 (-10.3, 5.3) -39.77 (-39.84, -39.64)
σβyεY 0.81 (-17.5, 23.4) -1.05 (-1.11, -0.95)
σβxεY -0.23 (-3.2, 8.9) 34.5 (34.0, 34.7)
log likelihood 1757909.73 1757916.56
Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates of model parameters. Confidence inter-
vals based on 160 bootstrap resamples for the full model and 500 for the reduced
model.
4.4 Results
Figures 4A and 4B show that both mean hand grip and mean knee strength
increase approximately linearly with body weight. The data were selected to
show such linear dependency, and the linear relation breaks down if a wider
range of weights are considered (not shown). Figures 4C and 4D show that
the variance of grip and knee strength depend on body weight, an indication of
effect variability. Figure 4E shows that the covariance between grip and knee
strength also depends on body weight, an indication of effect covariability.
To test the importance of causal-effect covariability in explaining the data,
two versions of the probability model (Equation 5) were fit to the data. A
version containing the parameter representing effect covariability (full model),
and a version without that parameter (reduced model). The results of the
fits are shown as dashed lines (full model) and dotted lines (reduced model) in
Figure 4. Visual inspection indicates that the model which included causal-effect
covariability better predicted the conditional covariance. A more quantitative
comparison is obtained by comparing the likelihoods of the fits. This show that
the full model explained more of the variability in the data (likelihood-ratio
test, D=13.65, p = 2.2 · 10−4). Table 3 shows the parameter values for the
two models. A simple calculation, using the parameters in the table and the
expression for the conditional covariance given in the appendix, shows that the
covariability of βX and βY accounted for most of the linear correlation between
knee and hand grip strength. The contributions of the regression terms, bX and
bY , were minor in comparison.
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Figure 4: Conditional means, variances and covariance for the real data. Dashed
lines show model predictions for the “full” model (with 13 parameters). Dotted
lines show predictions based on the model assuming no causal-effect covariabil-
ity. Error bars show approximate 95% confidence intervals. A: Conditional
mean for grip strength. B: Conditional mean for knee strength. C: Condi-
tional variance for grip strength, confidence intervals estimated by bootstrap-
ping. D: Conditional variance for knee strength, confidence intervals estimated
by bootstrapping. E: Conditional covariance of grip strength and knee strength,
confidence intervals estimated by bootstrapping.
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Figure 5: Causal graph illustrating the possibility of confounding without a
confounder.
5 Discussion
In this work I have formalized the notion of causal-effect covariability and shown
that if there is covariability in the effects of a confounder, then residual con-
founding will remain after adjustment for the confounder. Furthermore, evi-
dence in support of causal-effect covariability was demonstrated in real data.
In this section some issues regarding the interpretation of the main result are
discussed, as are conditions under which causal-effect covariability might be ex-
pected in applications. First however, it is important to emphasize that the
case of three observed variables used throughout the paper was chosen for di-
dactic reasons. In more realistic models, with many more interacting variables,
causal-effect covariability can lead to confounding through many routes. For ex-
ample, assume that the causal diagram shown in Figure 5 describes the causal
mechanisms in a single observational unit. According to this model only the di-
rect causal connection from X to Y will contribute to a statistical dependency
between X and Y within a single observational unit. However, if we assume
that the effect of Z1 on X and Z2 on Y varies between observational units
and moreover that these effects are statistically dependent, then the causal ef-
fect of X on Y cannot be identified from observations made on different units
without adjusting for other variables in addition to Z1 and Z2. In this model
causal-effect variability leads to confounding without a confounder! In terms
of the structural model of causality, this case corresponds to violation of the
modularity assumption (i.e. the error terms are not independent).
5.1 Adjusting for the level or the effect of a confounder?
One way of thinking about effect covariability of confounders is to make a dis-
tinction between the level of a confounder and the effect of a confounder. In the
example above, the confounder Z had two levels (zero or one), but the effect of
Z was an increase of the probabilities of exposure and outcome by 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 or
0.4 units (i.e. four levels). As shown, adjusting for the level of the confounder
led to residual confounding. On the other hand, knowing also the effect of the
confounder, it was possible to fully adjust for the confounding introduced by Z
(for example by stratification, as in Table 1).
It is perhaps contrary to common terminology to claim that the statistical
association between X and Y is caused by Z, when Z is held constant. On the
one hand side, when Z = 1 in the above example, all units receive the same
input (by assumption), so the input from Z cannot contribute variability to X
or Y (and hence not to their covariability). On the other hand, the effect of Z
differs between units (since α varies between observational units), so the effect
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of Z = 1 does contribute variability to X and Y . This highlights the difference
between adjusting for the level of a variable, and adjusting for the effect that
this variable has. Importantly, when the effect of a confounder is constant across
observational units, adjusting for the level of the confounder or for the effect of
the confounder would both fully account for the confounding introduced by the
confounder.
One could perhaps argue that Z and α in the example are two different
confounders, and by adjusting for only one of them there will of course be
residual confounding. However, this misses the important point that the two
confounders are intrinsically connected – α modulates the effect of Z – and that
these confounders should therefore be considered together.
In applications workers sometimes write that they adjust or control for “the
effect of” a confounder, when they have in fact adjusted for the level of the
confounder2. Perhaps this is an indication of that it is not uncommon to as-
sume constant effects of covariates. Note that the effects of a confounder are
typically not observed, and the applied researcher can only hope that adjusting
for the levels of a confounder will be sufficient to remove all the confounding
introduced. It is a real possibility that the magnitude of confounding introduced
by effect covariability could exceed the magnitude of confounding introduced by
the different levels of the confounder. This seemed to be the case in the real
data analyzed here.
5.2 Between or within unit variability
In this work the focus has been on between-unit variability of causal effects,
and it was assumed that the causal effects were constant within a given obser-
vational unit. However, this is not a necessary condition for residual confounding
to occur. Indeed, causal-effect variability within units might often be enough
to introduce residual confounding due to covariability of causal effects. It is
important to carefully consider all sources of variability when designing a study,
and to make sure that these sources are appropriately modeled in the analysis.
5.3 Random effects models
Causal-effect covariability can also be understood in terms of fixed- and random
effects models. If the effects of a confounder are assumed to be fixed (i.e. same
in all observational units) then current approaches to adjustment will remove
the confounding. If the effects of a confounder are more appropriately modeled
as random effects (i.e. the true effect size varies between observational units)
then the resulting confounding might not be removed by adjustment, as shown
here. In the real data example, the (assumed) linear relation between the weight
and the outcome variables (and the large number of observations) enabled an
estimate of the random effects of weight. It was shown that the covariability of
the effects of weight accounted for most of the statistical association between
the outcome variables; the contribution of the fixed effect was minor in compar-
2A search in the Web of Science Core Collection using variants of “controlling/adjusting for
the effect(s) of” indicate that this is a relatively common misconception as several thousands
of research papers make such claims in the abstract. Most of these papers are not in journals
focusing on Epidemiology, indicating that this misconception is widespread.
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ison. This might not be representative for observational studies in general, but
residual confounding through effect covariability might be relatively common.
Unfortunately, many designs used in observational studies do not allow for
estimation of random effects of covariates. If effect covariability is a concern it
might therefore be advantageous to use designs were such random effects can
be estimated (c.f Greenland 2000).
5.4 How common is causal-effect covariability
That the effects of a given cause varies between observational units is probably
very common. However, only when there is covariability between the effects
on the exposure and the effects on the outcome will these two be confounded
even after adjustment. Indeed, to generate the effect of the confounder Z in the
example above (Table 2), each individual had the same constant added to the
probabilities of exposure and outcome, perhaps not a very likely scenario in the
real world.
So how common is causal-effect covariability? This is an empirical question
that deserves more attention, but it seems likely that the presence or not of
covariability in part depends on the “distance” between the mechanisms pro-
ducing the effects on the exposure and the mechanisms producing the effects
on the outcome. Consider the following example: Assume that “work environ-
ment” (WE) is a potential confounder and consider first a study looking at the
effect of smoking on lung cancer. Its reasonable to assume that WE is a proxy
for factors that could cause both smoking and lung cancer. However the factors
that cause smoking (mainly social factors, say) and those that cause lung can-
cer (exposure to work-related toxic substances, say) act through very different
mechanisms (peer pressure vs mutations in respiratory epithelium cells, say). In
this case there are perhaps no a-priori reasons to believe that individuals more
susceptible to peer pressure would be more or less susceptible to carcinogenic
substances. When there is a large “distance” between the causal mechanisms,
causal-effect covariability might be small.
Consider now using the same covariate (WE) in a study of causal effects of
smoking on heavy drinking (of ethanol-containing beverages). In this case it
is possible that similar factors that cause smoking also cause heavy drinking
(different social norms in different work places, say). Moreover, in this case
the causal mechanisms are probably more similar – an individual more likely
to develop a regular smoking behavior might also be more likely to develop a
regular (heavy) drinking behavior (due to similar neural mechanisms involved
in learning these behaviors, say). In this case a more substantial causal-effect
covariability seem likely, and adjusting for work environment might not com-
pletely remove the association between smoking and drinking caused by WE.
In the real-data example the observations could be explained by a model
that included effect covariability. It might be possible to account for the data
equally well (similar likelihood) with models not including covariability, a more
solid proof of concept would probably require an experimental study. Still, the
provided evidence should be enough to warrant further investigations of causal-
effect covariability in data.
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5.5 Conclusions
Causal-effect covariability of a confounder introduces statistical associations be-
tween exposures and outcomes that cannot be controlled for by conventional
methods. In many empirical studies effect covariability of confounders cannot be
ruled out based on prior scientific knowledge. Effect covariability of confounders
should therefore be included as a possible explanation of the association between
exposures and outcomes in such studies.
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A Appendix
A.1 A linear causal model of the data
Here we consider a model for the real data described in the main text. In other
words, we want to model the effect of the three variables, hand grip strength X,
knee extension strength Y and body weight Z. We assume that there is linear
causal relation between Z and X and Y . Since there will most likely be other
factors influencing X and Y we need to include those in the model as well (even
if they are unobserved); let these common factors be represented by W . We
further assume that the effects of W on X and Y are independent of the effects
of Z.3 This gives the following causal model
Z := εZ
W := εW
U := εU
(αX , βX) := k(U, εk)
(αY , βY ) := h(U, εh)
X := αX + βXZ + θ(W ) + ε˜X
Y := αY + βY Z + φ(W ) + ε˜Y ,
(6)
where all the error terms (ε’s) are assumed to be mutually independent.
To continue it is helpful to re-write some of the terms in the above system
as a constant term (not changing between units) and a fluctuating term. So,
let αX = mX + εαX where mX represents the population average (over units)
and εαX the deviations from this average, and similarly for αY . Do a similar
decomposition of βX , i.e. write βX = bX + εβX , and similarly for βY . Finally,
let θ(W ) = tX + εθ, and φ(W ) = tY + εφ. Next, we simplify the equations for
X and Y by defining new error terms as
εX =εαX + εθ + ε˜X
εY =εαY + εφ + ε˜Y
(7)
and new constant terms as
µX =mX + tX
µY =mY + tY .
(8)
With this reformulations the equations for X and Y become
X := µX + (bX + εβX )Z + εX
Y := µY + (bY + εβY )Z + εY .
(9)
This change in notation simplifies the expressions for the conditional variances
and covariances below, but note that the error terms for X and Y (i.e. εX
and εY ) are no longer independent in this notation. Using standard rules for
variances and covariances it is straight forward to derive two consequences of
causal effect variability of Z:
3This assumption is made to limit the number of free parameters that must be estimated
from data. The assumption can be relaxed at the cost of introducing more variables.
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Constraint 1. The conditional variance of X (and Y ), given Z, is a quadratic
function of Z and is given by
V (X|Z) = σ2βXZ2 + 2σβXεXZ + σ2εX , (10)
and similarly for V (Y |Z).
Here σ2βX is the variance of εβX , σ
2
εX the variance of εX , and σβXεX is the
covariance between these terms. This expression shows that if there is causal-
effect variability in a linear causal model, the conditional variance will depend
on Z.
The next constraint involves covariability of the effects of Z.
Constraint 2. The conditional covariance of X and Y , given Z, is a quadratic
function of Z and is given by
C(X,Y |Z) = σβXβY Z2 + (σβXεY + σβY εX )Z + σεXεY (11)
Here σβXβY is the covariance between εβX and εβY , σεXεY the covariance
between εX and εY , σβXεY the covariance between εβX and εY , and similarly
for σβY εX . Next we use these constraints to derive a probability model for the
data.
A.2 A probability model for the data
To probe the evidence for causal-effect covariability in the data a probability
model is described here and fit to the data using maximum likelihood. In
particular, for a given value of Z, we will assume that the following model
describes the data:
X = µX + βXZ + εX
Y = µY + βY Z + εY
βX = bX + εβX
βY = bY + εβY
with
(εβX , εX , εβY , εY )
d
= N(0,Σ),
where N(0,Σ) represents the multivariate normal distribution, and
d
= denotes
equality in distribution. There are 14 parameters in this model (two constant
terms, two slope terms, and ten variance-covariance terms). However, the two
terms σβXεY and σβY εX cannot both be identified given the constraints derived
above. We therefore set σβXεY = σβY εX in the following. With this additional
constraint, the covariance matrix becomes
Σ =

σ2βX σβXεX σβXβY σβXεY
· σ2εX σβXεY σεXεY· · σ2βY σβY εY
· · · σ2εY
 .
To investigate the importance of the causal-effect covariability, a model where
σβXβY was forced to be zero was also fit to the data. In this “reduced model”
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the covariance matrix takes the following form
Σ =

σ2βX σβXεX 0 σβXεY
· σ2εX σβXεY σεXεY· · σ2βY σβY εY
· · · σ2εY
 .
The models were fit by maximizing the normal likelihood numerically over
levels of Z. In other words, for each level of Z, the covariance matrix of X and
Y is formed using the above expressions for conditional variance and covariance,
and the parameter values that maximize the likelihood are found numerically.
Local maxima are abundant as the model is close to be overparameterized,
and care was taken to find the global maximum. Standard errors of the fitted
parameters were obtained by bootstrapping. Code to fit the model to data
is provided in following GitHub repository: https://github.com/aledberg/
causal-covar.
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